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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to derive general results for certain classes of or-
dinal games. It is motivated by the increasingly important role that ordinal
properties have played in game-theoretic analysis in recent years. First of
all, the introduction of supermodular games by Topkis (1979) and the subse-
quent analysis by Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), Vives (1990),
and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) gave rise to an important new strand of
literature in economics and game theory. But strategic complementarity,
the key ingredient of supermodularity, is essentially an ordinal concept and
much of the theory of supermodular games can be reformulated in ordinal
terms. Second, since the seminal paper by Monderer and Shapley (1996), a
sizeable strand of literature on potential games has emerged. Monderer and
Shapley already distinguish between exact, weighted, and ordinal potentials
for cardinal games. Kukushkin (1999) and Norde and Patrone (2001) have
introduced the concept of ordinal potential for ordinal games.
Ordinality in strategic games stands for two different, not mutually exclu-
sive concepts. On the one hand, within the confines of traditional game the-
ory, an ordinal perspective abstracts from particular utility representations
(payoff functions). It considers invariant properties with respect to utility
representations. It identifies games having the same game form and iden-
tical ordinal preferences or identical best response correspondences. More
generally, it investigates isomorphisms and equivalence classes of games. For
the ordinal perspective of games, see the contributions of Thompson (1952),
Mertens (1987, 2003), Vermeulen and Jansen (2000), and Morris and Ui
(2004). On the other hand, the concept of ordinal games transcends tra-
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ditional game theory and allows for players’ preferences which do not ad-
mit utility representations. Many contributions to demand theory and gen-
eral equilibrium theory consider incomplete or intransitive preferences. Son-
nenschein (1971), Shafer (1974), Kim and Richter (1986) made pioneering
contributions to demand theory with incomplete or intransitive preferences.
Schmeidler (1969), Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), Bergstrom (1976), Bor-
glin and Keiding (1976), Shafer (1976) belong to the early contributors to
general equilibrium theory with incomplete or intransitive preferences. To
the extent that the work of these and subsequent authors deals with abstract
economies (generalized games, pseudo-games), it applies to ordinal games as
well.
Incomplete or intransitive preferences constitute an important, but not
the only class of preferences without utility representations. Specifically, the
present paper deals with ordinal games where players’ preference relations are
weak orders: Players’ preferences are complete and transitive, yet need not
admit utility representations. An example is the following public project
proposal game:
Consider the problem of locating a finite number of identical public
projects, say libraries, on a street represented by the unit interval. An
outcome of this problem is a list of locations. Ehlers (2002, 2003) sug-
gests that a library patron will visit his second choice library if a book
he wants to borrow is unavailable at the first choice library. Thus, the
patron’s preference for locations induces a “lexicographic” preference
relation for outcomes (lists of locations). Further consider two patrons,
each with single-peaked preferences for locations, both evaluating lists
of locations by means of the respective induced “lexicographic exten-
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sion” a` la Ehlers. Each patron proposes an outcome (list of locations).
The average of the two proposed outcomes gets implemented. The pro-
cedure gives rise to an ordinal game where players’ preference relations
are weak orders without utility representations. The game proves to
be a best-response potential game in the sense of subsection 3.1. For a
formal description and elaborate analysis of the public project proposal
game, see section 6.
As mentioned above, both potential games and supermodular games lend
themselves to ordinal analysis. Notice that in contrast to arbitrary finite
games, both finite potential games and finite supermodular games always
possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In both cases, a purely ordinal
approach can be taken. The arguments differ from the standard equilibrium
existence proofs by means of the Brouwer, Kakutani, or Fan-Glicksberg fixed
point theorem, which require a topological vector space structure and conti-
nuity in that topology.
To begin with, we introduce the concept of ordinal Nash equilibrium for
ordinal games. In the case of potential games, no fixed point theorem is
needed. We extend Voorneveld’s (2000) concept of best-response potential
from cardinal games to ordinal games in our sense and derive the analogue
of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a best-response potential
game if and only if it does not have a best-response cycle. In the case of
supermodular games, one can resort to the lattice-theoretic, non-topological
fixed point theorem of Zhou (1994). Next Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994)
concept of quasi-supermodularity is extended from cardinal games to ordinal
games in our sense. We find that under certain compactness and semiconti-
nuity assumptions, the ordinal Nash equilibria of a quasi-supermodular game
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form a nonempty complete lattice. As an immediate corollary, one obtains
that the ordinal Nash equilibria of a finite quasi-supermodular game form a
nonempty complete lattice.
Finally, we extend several set-valued solution concepts from cardinal to
ordinal games in our sense. The definition of rationalizability follows Pearce
(1984), with attention confined to pointwise beliefs, but not restricted to sub-
sets of Euclidean spaces. We prove the existence of a nonempty and compact
subset of rationalizable joint strategies in ordinal games where each individ-
ual strategy set is a compact Hausdorff space and all preference relations are
continuous. The definition of a closed set under a behavior relation is an
adaptation of Ritzberger and Weibull’s (1995) concept of a closed set under
a behavior correspondence, again without the restriction to subsets of Eu-
clidean spaces. We demonstrate the existence of a minimal closed set under
a behavior correspondence for the class of ordinal games where each strategy
set is a compact Hausdorff space. We show a similar result for minimal prep
sets, a concept adapted from Voorneveld (2004, 2005).
In sum, the contribution of this paper is two-fold: As a methodological
advance, all concepts, assertions, and derivations are formulated in purely
ordinal terms. Moreover, we generalize several previous results by relaxing
the restrictions imposed in the literature: In addition to weaker assumptions
regarding strategy spaces and preferences in some instances, finiteness of the
player set is not assumed in Theorems 1, 3–5.
The next section contains the basic definitions regarding weak orders
and ordinal games. We also elaborate on the fact that our assumptions on
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strategy sets and preferences are more general than the stated assumptions
for cardinal games. Section 3 is devoted to potential games. Section 4 is
about quasi-supermodular games. Section 5 is about set-valued concepts.
Section 6 provides a formal description and elaborate analysis of the public
project proposal game. Section 7 offers final remarks.
2 Preliminaries
We first collect some definitions and properties pertaining to preference re-
lations, in particular weak orders. We then define ordinal games and related
concepts, in particular ordinal Nash equilibria. For two nonempty sets S and
Y , ψ : S →→ Y denotes a relation from S to Y , that is a mapping ψ : S → 2Y
that assigns to each s ∈ S a subset ψ(s) of Y . The relation ψ is called a
correspondence if ψ(s) 6= ∅ for all s ∈ S.
2.1 Weak Orders
Let X be a nonempty set. A binary relation º on X is called a weak order
if it is transitive and strongly complete. The latter means that x º y or
y º x for all x, y ∈ X. For a weak order º on X, its asymmetric part Â,
defined by
x Â z :⇐⇒ [x º z&¬(z º x)]
for all x, z ∈ X, is irreflexive and transitive, and its symmetric part ∼,
defined by
x ∼ z :⇐⇒ [x º z& z º x]
for all x, z ∈ X, is an equivalence relation, that is reflexive, symmetric and
transitive. A weak order º is called a total order if it is antisymmet-
ric: x ∼ z =⇒ x = z for all x, z ∈ X. The weak order º has or admits
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a utility representation if there exists a function u : X → IR such that
x º y ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y) for x, y ∈ X. Then u is called a utility or payoff
function representing º or a utility representation of º.
In case X is endowed with a topology τ , we say that º is upper semi-
continuous if the sets {x ∈ X|x ≺ z}, z ∈ X, are open and º is lower
semicontinuous if the sets {x ∈ X|x Â z}, z ∈ X, are open. º is continu-
ous if it is both upper and lower semicontinuous. The order topology on X
induced by º has the sets {x ∈ X|x Â z}, z ∈ X, and {x ∈ X|x ≺ z}, z ∈ X,
as a subbase of open sets. By definition, º is continuous in its order topology.
An element z ∈ X is called a maximal element of the binary relation
º on X if {x ∈ X|x Â z} = ∅. It is called a greatest element if z º x
for all x ∈ X. In the case of a weak order, maximal and greatest elements
coincide. For convenient reference, we state the following well known fact.
Lemma 1 Let (X, τ) be a compact topological space and º be an upper
semicontinuous weak order on X. Then the set of maximal elements of º is
nonempty and compact.
generality of assumptions. It is important to note that the lemma
applies in instances where º does not admit a utility representation, like in
the following example.
Example 1. LetX = [0, 1]×{0, 1} be endowed with the following total order
º which is the restriction of the lexicographic order on IR2 to [0, 1]× {0, 1}:
For x, y ∈ [0, 1], with x > y, (x, 1) Â (x, 0) Â (y, 1) Â (y, 0).
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Let τ be the order topology induced by º . Then the following hold:
(i) (X, τ) is a compact Hausdorff space.
(ii) º is continuous with respect to τ .
(iii) º does not have a utility representation.
proof. (i) For (x, a), (y, b) ∈ X with x > y, {χ ∈ X|χ Â ((x+y)/2, 0)} and
{χ ∈ X|χ ≺ ((x + y)/2, 0)} are disjoint open sets with (x, a) ∈ {χ ∈ X|χ Â
((x+y)/2, 0)} and (y, b) ∈ {χ ∈ X|χ ≺ ((x+y)/2, 0)}. For (x, 1), (x, 0) ∈ X,
{χ ∈ X|χ Â (x, 0)} and {χ ∈ X|χ ≺ (x, 1)} are disjoint open sets with
(x, 1) ∈ {χ ∈ X|χ Â (x, 0)} and (x, 0) ∈ {χ ∈ X|χ ≺ (x, 1)}. This shows
that (X, τ) is Hausdorff.
If (X,º) is order-complete, i.e. if every non-empty subset of X with an
upper bound has a supremum, then every closed and bounded subset of X
is compact in the order topology. See Problem 5.C in Kelley (1955). Now
every subset of X is bounded. Thus, if we can show that every non-empty
subset of X has a supremum, then compactness of (X, τ) is demonstrated.
For a non-empty subsetA ofX, letA1 = {x ∈ [0, 1] : (x, 0) ∈ A or (x, 1) ∈
A}. In case (supA1, 1) ∈ A, (supA1, 1) is the supremum of A. In case
(supA1, 1) 6∈ A, (supA1, 0) is the supremum of A. In any case, A has a
supremum. This shows that (X,º) is order-complete and, consequently,
(X, τ) is compact.
(ii) By definition, º is continuous in its order topology.
(iii) º has a continuum of “gaps” of the form ((x, 0), (x, 1)), x ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, it does not have any (continuous or discontinuous) utility repre-
sentation.
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Amoz Kats has suggested the following interpretation of the example. A
voter has preferences over pairs (x, c) where x ∈ [0, 1] is the platform chosen
by a political candidate and c ∈ {0, 1} is one of the two candidates. If the
voter has the choice between two different platforms, the identity of the can-
didates does not matter. If both candidates offer the same platform, then
the voter has a preference for candidate 1.
The relation º in Example 1 is the restriction of the lexicographic order
on IR2 to X. The restriction of the lexicographic order to the unit square
[0, 1]2 creates a similar example. A further example with properties (a)-(c)
can be generated by means of the well ordering principle.
Example 2. Namely, let º be a well order on IR, i.e. º is a total order
such that every nonempty subset of IR has a minimum. For each r ∈ IR, let
Ir = {x ∈ IR : r Â x}. Let R = {r ∈ IR : Ir is uncountable}. If R = ∅,
set Ω = IR. If R 6= ∅, set Ω = IminR. Then º induces a well order on Ω
which does not have a utility representation. Choose an element ω∗ 6∈ Ω, set
X = Ω ∪ {ω∗} and extend the well order to X by postulating ω∗ Â ω for all
ω ∈ Ω. A well order º renders (X,º) order-complete so that one can follow
the pattern of proof of Example 1.
The literature has been mostly concerned with the existence of continu-
ous or upper semi-continuous utility representations for continuous or upper
semi-continuous weak orders. The key results of the seminal contributions
of Eilenberg (1941), Debreu (1954), Rader (1963) can be summarized as fol-
lows: Let X be a topological space which is second countable (has a countable
base of open sets) or is separable and connected. If º is a continuous weak
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order on X then º has a continuous utility representation.1 Beardon et al.
(2002) provide a classification of total orders which do not admit a utility
representation. The lexicographic order is a prominent example of the so-
called “planar type”. Example 2 is of the so-called “long type”. Este´vez
Toranzo and Herve´s Beloso (1995) show that if X 6= ∅ is a non-separable
metric space, then there exists a continuous weak order on X which cannot
be represented by a utility function. However, this result becomes obsolete
under the compactness assumption of Lemma 1: If X is a compact metric
space then it is separable and second countable.
2.2 Ordinal Games
Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) denote an ordinal non-cooperative game
with the following interpretation and properties:
• N 6= ∅ denotes the set of players.
• Every player i ∈ N has a nonempty set Xi of strategies. The prod-
uct set X =
∏
i∈N Xi represents the set of joint strategies or strategy
profiles.
• Every player i ∈ N has a binary relation ºi over the joint strategy
set X, which reflects his preferences over the outcomes of the game G.
Each of the binary relations ºi is assumed to be a weak order.
We denote X−i =
∏
j∈N\{i}Xj. For a player i ∈ N and a joint strategy
x = (xj)j∈N ∈ X, we write x−i = (xj)j 6=i ∈ X−i and, with slight abuse of
notation, x = (xi, x−i) ∈ X. For every player i ∈ N and every joint strategy
1For generalizations and variations, see Rader (1963), Monteiro (1987), Candeal,
Herve´s, and Indura´in (1998), Bosi and Mehta (2002).
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of his opponents x−i ∈ X−i,
Mi(x−i) = {xi ∈ Xi | 6 ∃zi ∈ Xi : (zi, x−i) Âi (xi, x−i)}
is the set of best responses, that is the set of i’s maximal strategies against
x−i under ºi. Recall that every maximal element is a greatest element be-
cause ºi is a weak order. For every player i ∈ N and every joint strategy
x = (xi, x−i) ∈ Xi ×X−i, we denote by
Bi(x) = {zi ∈ Xi | (zi, x−i) ºi (xi, x−i)}
the set of better responses or upper contour set.
Let B :X →→ X, x 7→ ∏i∈N Bi(x) be the joint better-response relation.
Let M : X →→ X, x 7→ ∏i∈N Mi(x−i) be the joint best-response relation
which maps each joint strategy to its joint best-responses. The set of ordinal
Nash equilibria of G is defined by
N (G) = {x ∈ X |x ∈M(x)}.
When appropriate, we shall consider each strategy set Xi endowed with a
topology. For the remainder of this paragraph, suppose each individual strat-
egy space Xi is endowed with a topology τi and X =
∏
iXi is endowed with
the corresponding product topology. We say that ºi is upper semicontin-
uous on Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i if the set of better responses Bi(xi, x−i) is a
closed subset of Xi for every x = (xi, x−i) ∈ X. Clearly, if a preference ºi is
continuous on X then it is upper semicontinuous on X and upper semicon-
tinuous on Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i.
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3 Ordinal Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley (1996) develop the concept of potential for cardinal
games Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) in both cardinal and ordinal versions. Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996), Voorneveld and Norde (1997) and Ui (2000) char-
acterize several classes of potential games. However, their approach is biased
towards the cardinal side since it requires the potential to be a real-valued
function, while from a strictly ordinal viewpoint, the potential provides an
order. Consequently, Kukushkin (1999) and Norde and Patrone (2001) have
introduced the concept of ordinal potential for ordinal games. An ordinal
game has a potential if there exists a quasi-order on X, that is a reflexive
and transitive binary relation º, containing the preferences of all players:
(xi, x−i) ºi (zi, x−i) ⇐⇒ (xi, x−i) º (zi, x−i) for all i ∈ N , xi, zi ∈ Xi,
x−i ∈ X−i.
Voorneveld (2000) introduces and studies best-response potential games,
a new class of potential games. A game Γ = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N), is a best-
response potential game if there exists a real-valued function P : X → IR
such that for every i ∈ N , x−i ∈ X−i, we have
arg max
xi∈Xi
ui(xi, x−i) = arg max
xi∈Xi
P (xi, x−i).
Here, we adapt his definition for ordinal games. An ordinal game G =
(N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) is a best-response potential game if there exists a
quasi-order D on X, such that for every i ∈ N , x−i ∈ X−i, we have
Mi(x−i) =MD(x−i)
where MD(x−i) denotes the set of greatest elements of D over Xi given
x−i ∈ X−i. Obviously, the definitions imply that if an ordinal game is a
potential game, then it is a best-response potential game. It is clear from
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the definition of a best-response potential that (i) each greatest element of
D is an ordinal Nash equilibrium of G; (ii) the set of ordinal Nash equilibria
of G coincides with the set of ordinal Nash equilibria of the ordinal game
(N, (Xi)i∈N , (D)i∈N) provided D is a weak order on X.
3.1 Characterization of best-response potentials
Voorneveld (2000) provides a characterization of best-response potential games.
We implement in the ordinal setting the ideas introduced in Voorneveld
(2000) and Norde and Patrone (2001). First we need the following definition.
Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) be an ordinal game. A path in the set of
joint strategies X is a sequence (x1, x2, . . .) of elements xk ∈ X such that for
all k = 1, 2, . . . , the joint strategies xk and xk+1 differ in exactly one, say the
i(k)th, component. A path is best-response compatible if the deviating
player moves to a best response, that is
∀k = 1, 2, . . . : xk+1i(k) ∈Mi(k)(xk−i(k)).
By definition the trivial path (x1) consisting of a single joint strategy x1 ∈ X
is best-response compatible. A finite path (x1, x2, . . . , xm) is called a best-
response cycle if it is best-response compatible, x1 = xm, and xk+1 =
(xk+1i(k) , x
k
−i(k)) Âi(k) xk for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Theorem 1 An ordinal game G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) is a best-response
potential game if and only if there is no best-response cycle.
proof. (⇒) Assume that G is an ordinal game with best-response potential
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D. Suppose that (x1, x2, . . . , xm) is a best-response cycle. Define by B the
asymmetric part of D on X, that is for all x, z ∈ X,
xB z :⇐⇒ [xD z&¬(z D x)] .
By definition, xk+1i(k) ∈ Mi(k)(xk−i(k)) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and xk+1 =
(xk+1i(k) , x
k
−i(k)) Âi(k) xk for at least one such k. So xk+1 D xk for all k ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1} and xm D x1 by transitivity. But since there is at least one k
such that xk+1 Âi(k) xk we necessarily have xk+1B xk for this k by definition
of a best-response potential. It follows that xm D xk+1 B xk D x1 which in
turn implies that xm B x1, contradicting the fact that x1 = xm.
(⇐) Suppose that G has no best-response cycle. Define the binary rela-
tion (X,D) as follows:
(∀x, z ∈ X) : z D x :⇐⇒ [∃ a best-response compatible path from x to z]
First note that the binary relation D on X is reflexive and transitive; i.e., it
is a quasi-order. We have to show that Mi(x−i) = MD(x−i) for every i ∈ N
and x−i ∈ X−i. Let i ∈ N, x−i ∈ X−i.
(a) Pick zi ∈ Mi(x−i). Since ºi is strongly complete, for all xi ∈ Xi we
have that (zi, x−i) ºi (xi, x−i), hence the path ((xi, x−i), (zi, x−i)) is best-
response compatible and (zi, x−i)D (xi, x−i). Therefore, zi ∈MD(x−i). This
observation implies that Mi(x−i) ⊆MD(x−i).
(b) Pick zi ∈MD(x−i). Suppose zi 6∈Mi(x−i). Then there exists xi ∈ Xi
such that (xi, x−i) Âi (zi, x−i). By the absence of a best-response cycle,
it cannot be the case that (zi, x−i) D (xi, x−i), contradicting zi ∈ MD(x−i).
We conclude that zi ∈ Mi(x−i). From this observation we get Mi(x−i) ⊇
MD(x−i).
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The assertion that (X,D) is a best-response potential for G follows from
(a) and (b).
Voorneveld (2000, Theorem 3.1) proves in a cardinal setting that a best-
response potential exists if and only if: (i) X contains no best-response cycles
and (ii) the quotient of (X,D) can be represented by a real-valued function.
Theorem 1 states that from a purely ordinal perspective, condition (ii) has
nothing to do with best-response potential games. A similar remark has been
made by Norde and Patrone (2001) for the class of ordinal potential games.
Finally note that if (x1, x2, . . . , xm) is a best-response cycle, then it is
a weak improvement cycle in the sense of Norde and Patrone (2001), that
is xk+1 = (xk+1i(k) , x
k
−i(k)) ºi(k) xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, x1 = xm, and
xk+1 = (xk+1i(k) , x
k
−i(k)) Âi(k) xk for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. A weak improve-
ment path is thus a path such that at each iteration one player is drawn from
the population to play a better response against the current joint strategy
of his opponents. Theorem 2.2 in Norde and Patrone (2001) states that an
ordinal game G is a potential game if and only if G contains no weak im-
provement cycle.
3.2 Existence of Ordinal Nash Equilibria
If a finite ordinal game has a best-response potential, then it has an ordinal
Nash equilibrium. If we consider best-response potential games in which all
but one player have a finite set of strategies, and if we equip the only infinite
strategy set with a topology we obtain the following result.
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Theorem 2 Let G = (N, (Xj)j∈N , (ºj)j∈N) be a best-response potential
game with N finite. If for some i ∈ N , Xj is a finite set for every j 6= i, Xi is
a compact topological space and ºi is upper semicontinuous on Xi for each
x−i ∈ X−i, then N (G) is nonempty.
proof. Suppose that N (G) is empty. Let i satisfy the hypothesis. Be-
cause of the compactness and upper semicontinuity conditions, Mi(x−i) is
nonempty and compact for every x−i ∈ X−i, by Lemma 1. For every
j 6= i, Mj(x−j) is nonempty for each x−j ∈ X−j by the finiteness of Xj.
Pick any selection mi(·) from Mi(·) and any x−i in X−i. Construct a best-
response compatible path (x1, x2, . . .) as follows: x1 = (mi(x−i), x−i) and
for k = 2, 3, . . . , if xki 6∈ Mi(xk−i), then xk+1 = (mi(xk−i), xk−i); otherwise
xk+1 = (zk+1j(k) , x
k
−j(k)) for some player j(k) 6= i such that zk+1j(k) ∈ Mj(k)(xk−j(k))
and (zk+1j(k) , x
k
−j(k)) Âj(k) xk. Note that such a player j(k) exists by the pre-
sumed emptiness of N (G). Since X−i is a finite set and player i uses only
the finite set of strategies mi(X−i), there exist k, l ∈ N such that xk = xk+l.
Hence (xk, xk+1, . . . , xk+l) is a best-response cycle which by Theorem 1 con-
tradicts the premise that G is a best-response potential game. We conclude
that G possesses at least one Nash equilibrium.
This existence result extends earlier results by Voorneveld (1997) and
Norde and Tijs (1998) which were obtained in a cardinal setting for exact
potential games and generalized ordinal potential games, respectively.
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4 Quasi-Supermodular Ordinal Games
(Games with Strategic Complementarities)
Let X be a partially ordered set, with the reflexive, antisymmetric and tran-
sitive binary relation ≥. Given elements x and z in X, denote by x ∨ z the
least upper bound or join of x and z in X, provided it exists, and x ∧ z the
greatest lower bound ormeet of x and z in X, provided it exists. A partially
ordered set X that contains the join and the meet of each pair of its elements
is called a lattice. A lattice in which each nonempty subset has a supremum
and an infimum is complete. In particular, a finite lattice is complete. If Y
is a subset of a lattice X and Y contains the join and the meet with respect
to X of each pair of elements of Y , then is Y is a sublattice of X. A sub-
lattice Y of a lattice X in which each nonempty subset has a supremum and
an infimum with respect to X that are contained in Y is a subcomplete
sublattice of X. Any finite sublattice of a lattice is subcomplete.
We now define an order on the subsets of a lattice. We use the strong set
order ≥s introduced by Milgrom and Shannon (1994). Let X be a lattice
and let Y and Z be two subsets of X. We say that Y ≥s Z if for every y ∈ Y
and every z ∈ Z, y∨z ∈ Y and y∧z ∈ Z. We say that a relation ρ : X →→ Y
from a lattice X to a lattice Y is increasing in x on X if for every x ∈ X,
ρ(x) is a sublattice of Y and if for x ≥ z, ρ(x) ≥s ρ(z).
If X is a lattice partially ordered by the relation ≥, then subsets of the
form [a, b] = {x ∈ X : b ≥ x ≥ a}, [a,∞) = {x ∈ X : x ≥ a}, or
(−∞, b] = {x ∈ X : b ≥ x} are sublattices of X for all a, b ∈ X. These sets
and X are the closed intervals in X. We say that a lattice X is equipped
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with the interval topology when each closed set can be represented as the
intersection of sets that are finite unions of closed intervals in X, including
the empty set as the empty union of sets. In other words, the closed intervals
constitute a subbase of closed sets of the interval topology.
Next consider an ordinal game. Suppose that each individual strategy set
Xi is a lattice partially ordered by the relation ≥i. Then the product sets X
and X−i, i ∈ N , are also lattices with respect to the canonical partial orders
≥ and ≥−i, i ∈ N , respectively. For instance, x ≥ y ⇔ ∀i : xi ≥i yi for
x, y ∈ X. We say that the preference ºi is quasi-supermodular on Xi for
each x−i ∈ X−i if for every xi, zi ∈ Xi, xi 6= zi, x−i ∈ X−i,
(i) (xi, x−i) ºi (xi ∧ zi, x−i) =⇒ (xi ∨ zi, x−i) ºi (zi, x−i);
(ii) (xi, x−i) Âi (xi ∧ zi, x−i) =⇒ (xi ∨ zi, x−i) Âi (zi, x−i).
We say that a preference ºi satisfies the strategic complement property
in (xi, x−i) on Xi × X−i if for every xi, zi ∈ Xi and x−i, z−i ∈ X−i with
xi ≥i zi, xi 6= zi and x−i ≥−i z−i, x−i 6= z−i,
(iii) (xi, z−i) ºi (zi, z−i) =⇒ (xi, x−i) ºi (zi, x−i);
(iv) (xi, z−i) Âi (zi, z−i) =⇒ (xi, x−i) Âi (zi, x−i).
An ordinal game G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) is quasi-supermodular
if for each i ∈ N , Xi is a lattice, ºi is quasi-supermodular on Xi for each
x−i ∈ X−i, and ºi satisfies the strategic complement property on Xi ×X−i.
Quasi-supermodular games in a cardinal setting were introduced by Mi-
grom and Shannon (1994). Note that a (quasi-supermodular) game Γ =
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(N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) with payoff functions ui : X → IR, i ∈ N , uniquely
determines a (quasi-supermodular) ordinal game G. But not every ordinal
quasi-supermodular game has a cardinal representation. For instance, take
the pair (X,º) from Example 1 as the strategy space and the preference
relation of the player in a one-person game. Moreover, let X = [0, 1]×{0, 1}
be partially ordered according to the canonical partial order on IR2. Then
the one-player game is quasi-supermodular and does not have a cardinal
representation.
Lemma 2 Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) be a quasi-supermodular game.
Then for each i ∈ N , Mi(x−i) is increasing in x−i on X−i.
proof. Pick x−i ≥−i z−i and xi ∈ Mi(x−i), zi ∈ Mi(z−i). The elements
xi ∧ zi and xi ∨ zi are in Xi since Xi is a lattice. We have (zi, z−i) ºi
(xi ∧ zi, z−i). Then (zi ∨ xi, z−i) ºi (xi, z−i) by quasi-supermodularity and,
consequently, (xi∨zi, x−i) ºi (xi, x−i) by the strategic complement property.
Since xi ∈ Mi(x−i), it cannot be the case that (xi ∨ zi, x−i) Âi (xi, x−i).
Therefore, (xi ∨ zi, x−i) ∼i (xi, x−i), which implies zi ∨ xi ∈ Mi(x−i). Now
suppose (zi, z−i) Âi (xi ∧ zi, z−i). Then (zi ∨ xi, z−i) Âi (xi, z−i) by quasi-
supermodularity and hence (xi ∨ zi, x−i) Âi (xi, x−i) by the strategic com-
plement property. But this contradicts (xi ∨ zi, x−i) ∼i (xi, x−i) (and xi ∈
Mi(x−i)). Therefore, (zi, z−i) ∼i (xi∧zi, z−i), which implies xi∧zi ∈Mi(z−i).
We have shown Mi(x−i) ≥s Mi(z−i). Finally, setting x−i = z−i yields
xi ∨ zi ∈ Mi(x−i) and xi ∧ zi ∈ Mi(x−i) for xi, zi ∈ Mi(x−i) — which means
that Mi(x−i) is a sublattice of Xi. This completes the proof.
Theorem 3 Let the game G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) be quasi-supermodular
and each individual strategy set Xi be equipped with the interval topology.
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If for all i ∈ N , the set Xi is compact and the preference ºi is upper semi-
continuous on Xi for every x−i ∈ X−i, then the set of ordinal Nash equilibria
of G, N (G), is a nonempty complete lattice.
proof. Birkhoff’s theorem (1967, Theorem X.20) states that a lattice is
compact in its interval topology if and only if it is complete.2 Hence each
Xi is a complete lattice and, therefore, has a lower bound `i and an upper
bound oi; consequently, the closed intervals of the form [ai, bi] constitute a
subbase of closed sets for the interval topology. The product X =
∏
i∈N Xi
is compact in the product topology as the product of compact spaces. X has
lower bound ` = (`i)i∈N and upper bound o = (oi)i∈N and the cylinder sets
of the form [ai, bi]×
∏
j 6=iXj, i ∈ N , with Xj = [`j, oj] for j ∈ N , constitute
a subbase B of closed sets for the product topology. The closed intervals of
the form [a, b] =
∏
i∈N [ai, bi] constitute a subbase B′ of closed sets for the
interval topology on X. On the one hand, B ⊆ B′. On the other hand, each
[a, b] ∈ B′ is a closed set in the product topology, for
[a, b] =
∏
i∈N
[ai, bi] =
⋂
i∈N
(
[ai, bi]×
∏
j 6=i
Xj
)
.
This shows that B′ is a subbase of closed sets for both the product topology
and the interval topology on X. Hence the assertion of Frink (1942, Theorem
4) holds: The product and the interval topology on X coincide. Thus, X
is compact in its interval topology. By Birkhoff’s theorem, X is a complete
lattice.
Now let i ∈ N . The best-response relation Mi : X−i →→ Xi is nonempty-
and compact-valued by Lemma 1 and is increasing with respect to the strong
2We adopt Frink’s (1942) and Topkis’ (1998) definition of the interval topology, which
in contrast to Birkhoff’s does not presume existence of a priori universal lower and upper
bounds. Birkhoff’s proof still applies.
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set order by Lemma 2. Therefore, the joint best-response relation M from
X to itself, with M(x) =
∏
i∈N Mi(x−i), is a compact-valued correspondence
as the product of compact-valued correspondences and is increasing as the
product of increasing correspondences.
Next pick any x ∈ X. Since M(x) is compact in X, it is also compact
as a subspace of X when X is endowed with the product topology. Hence
M(x) is also compact as a subspace of X when X is endowed with the inter-
val topology because the product and the interval topology on X coincide.
Consider any nonempty subset A of M(x). Since X is a complete lattice,
supX A, the supremum of A in X exists. We claim supX A ∈ M(x). As ob-
served above, the closed intervals of the form [a, b] form a subbase of closed
sets for both topologies on X. Therefore, the sets M(x) ∩ [a, b], a, b ∈ X,
form a subbase of closed sets for the topological subspace M(x) of X. Now
consider the family of sets M(x) ∩ [a, supX A], a ∈ A. Let F be a finite
nonempty subset of A. Since M(x) is a sublattice of X, supX F ∈ M(x)
and a ≤ supX F ≤ supX A for a ∈ F . Hence supX F belongs to the in-
tersection of the sets M(x) ∩ [a, supX A], a ∈ F . Since the family of closed
sets M(x) ∩ [a, supX A], a ∈ A, has nonempty finite intersections and M(x)
is compact, the entire family has a nonempty intersection. Let b belong to
this intersection. Then b ∈ M(x) and a ≤ b ≤ supX A for all a ∈ A. Hence
b ∈ M(x) and b = supX A, which shows our claim that supX A ∈ M(x).
In an analogous way, one proves infX A ∈ M(x). Since A was an arbitrary
nonempty subset, M(x) is a subcomplete sublattice of X.3
To summarize, the joint best-response relation M is an increasing corre-
3Topkis (1998, p. 31), referring to Topkis (1977), states that when X is a lattice with
the interval topology and X ′ is a sublattice of X, then X ′ is subcomplete if and only if
X ′ is compact in the relative topology. We have demonstrated the “if” part in case X is
a complete lattice.
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spondence from the complete lattice X to itself andM(x) is a nonempty and
subcomplete sublattice for each x ∈ X. The assertion of the theorem follows
from Zhou’s fixed-point theorem (1994, Theorem 1, p. 297).
Corollary 1 Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) be a finite quasi-supermodular
game. Then the set of ordinal Nash equilibria of G, N (G), is a nonempty
complete lattice.
5 Set-Valued Concepts
Set-valued concepts have proved to have many desirable properties in large
classes of cardinal games G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N). Here we consider two
set-valued concepts: the set of rationalizable joint strategies introduced inde-
pendently by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) and the concept of minimal
closed set under some behavior correspondence introduced by Ritzberger and
Weibull (1995). We are going to extend the field of applications of these set-
valued concepts from cardinal games to ordinal games. However, in contrast
to most of the literature, our definitions involve only pure strategies. The
reason is that there is no straightforward and commonly agreed upon ex-
tension of ordinal preferences from pure to mixed strategies. The modified
concepts have similar properties as the original ones and may be of interest
on their own. In fact, Basu (1992) and Pruzhansky (2003) work with point-
wise beliefs or conjectures like us.
A strategy for a player is rationalizable if it survives iterated removal of
strategies that are never a best response. Rationalizability is a concept that
generalizes that of Nash equilibrium. Minimal closed set under some behavior
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correspondence is a concept that generalizes that of strict Nash equilibrium.
More precisely, Basu and Weibull (1991) introduce first the concept of closed
set under rational behavior (curb), a set-valued extension of the strict Nash
equilibrium concept for cardinal games G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N). A product
set of pure strategies is closed under rational behavior if it is non-empty and
compact and contains the image under the best-response correspondence of
every mixed joint strategy with support in this set. A curb set is minimal if
it does not contain any proper subset which is curb. As noted by Basu and
Weibull (1991), the set of rationalizable joint strategies is the largest tight
curb set. Thus, a minimal curb set and the set of rationalizable joint strate-
gies can be viewed as the two ends of a spectrum. Ritzberger and Weibull
(1995) generalize the concept of curb set to a very large class of behavior
correspondences. A product set of pure strategies is closed under some be-
havior correspondence if it is non-empty and compact and contains the image
under the particular correspondence of every mixed joint strategy with sup-
port in this set. The class of behavior correspondences considered by the
authors includes the better-response correspondence and the best-response
correspondence. All these set-valued concepts have proved to be very useful
to characterize stable sets of dynamic strategy adjustments (Ritzberger and
Weibull, 1995; Young, 1998; Matros and Josephson, 2004).
Pearce (1984) considers only finite games. Bernheim (1984) considers
games where each strategy space Xi is a compact subset of some Euclidean
space and every ui : X → IR is continuous. Similarly, Basu and Weibull
(1991) prove the existence of minimal curb sets for the mixed extension of
games G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) where each Xi is a compact set in some Eu-
clidean space and every payoff function ui : X → IR is continuous. Ritzberger
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and Weibull (1995) focus on finite games. We consider a more general set-
ting: In Theorem 4 on the existence of rationalizable joint strategies, each
strategy set is endowed with a compact Hausdorff topology and each player’s
preference ºi is continuous on X. In Theorem 5 on the existence of minimal
closed sets under a behavior relation, each individual strategy space is com-
pact and Hausdorff. Theorem 5 (iv) states an analogous result for minimal
prep sets a` la Voorneveld (2004, 2005). Notice that our specification cannot
be reduced to the class of games G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) considered by
Bernheim (1984) and Basu and Weibull (1991). The reason is that the clas-
sical utility representation theorems of Eilenberg (1941) and Debreu (1954,
1964) apply only to separable topological spaces that is topological spaces
which include a countable dense subset.4
In the following subsections, we prove (i) the existence of a nonempty
and compact subset of rationalizable joint strategies in ordinal games where
each Xi is a compact Hausdorff space and each preference ºi is continuous
on X; (ii) the existence of at least one minimal closed set under a behavior
relation for the class of ordinal games where each Xi is a compact Hausdorff
space.
5.1 Rationalizable strategies
We shall define rationalizability via the method used by Pearce (1984). In
addition, attention is confined to pointwise beliefs. For each i ∈ N , construct
4A more recent result due to Monteiro (1987) requires that the underlying topological
space is arc-connected and the preferences ºi are continuous and countably bounded.
Recall that the weak order ºi on X is countably bounded if there is a countable subset Z
of X such that for every x ∈ X, there exist z1, z2 ∈ Z such that z1 ºi x ºi z2.
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a sequence Hki , k ∈ N, of subsets of Xi as follows: Let H1i = Xi and define
Hki inductively for k = 2, 3, . . . by
Hki =
xi ∈ Hk−1i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃x−i ∈
∏
j∈N\{i}
Hk−1j : xi ∈Mi(x−i)
 .
The set of rationalizable strategies of player i ∈ N is defined as
Ri =
⋂
k∈N
Hki
and a joint strategy x ∈ X is rationalizable if x ∈ R :=∏i∈N Ri.
Theorem 4 Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) be an ordinal game. Suppose
that for each i ∈ N , the set of strategies Xi is equipped with a compact
Hausdorff topology and the preference ºi is continuous on X. Then the set
of joint rationalizable strategies R ⊆ X is nonempty and compact.
proof. We shall show by induction on k that Hki , k ∈ N, is a nested
sequence of nonempty and closed subsets of the compact space Xi for all
i ∈ N . Therefore, the intersection Ri is nonempty and closed. Consequently,
Ri is compact as a closed subset of a compact space.
the induction argument: For each i ∈ N , H1i = Xi is closed by
definition. Consider any k ∈ N and suppose that ∏i∈N Hki is the Cartesian
product of nonempty and closed sets. Then each Hki is a nonempty and
compact subset of the compact space Xi and
∏
i∈N H
k
i is a nonempty and
compact subspace of X. We have to show that each Hk+1i is also nonempty
and closed. Since for i ∈ N , the preference ºi is continuous on X, its
restriction to
∏
j∈N H
k
j is continuous as well. For every x−i ∈ Hk−i =
∏
j 6=iH
k
j ,
the restriction of ºi to Hki × {x−i} is also continuous. Hence by Lemma 1,
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the set Mi(x−i|Hki ) = {xi ∈ Hki |(xi, x−i) ºi (zi, x−i) for all zi ∈ Hki } is
nonempty and compact. Hence Hk+1i is nonempty as the union of the sets
Mi(x−i|Hki ), x−i ∈ Hk−i.
It remains to show that Hk+1i is closed. To this end, it suffices to show
that for any net in Hk+1i converging to a point x
∗
i in Xi, it follows that x
∗
i
belongs to Hk+1i . Suppose that (D,À) is a directed set, that xδi , δ ∈ D,
is a net in Hk+1i and that the net x
δ
i , δ ∈ D, converges to x∗i ∈ Xi. For
each δ ∈ D, let us select an xδ−i ∈ Hk−i such that xδi ∈ Mi(xδ−i|Hki ). Then
(xδi , x
δ
−i), δ ∈ D, is a net in
∏
j∈N H
k
j . Since
∏
j∈N H
k
j is compact, there exists
a subnet of (xδi , x
δ
−i), δ ∈ D, convergent to some (x′i, x′−i) ∈ X. Without
restriction, we may assume that (xδi , x
δ
−i), δ ∈ D, is such a subnet. Then
the net xδi , δ ∈ D, converges to both x′i and x∗i . Since Xi is Hausdorff,
x′i = x
∗
i . Because of continuity of the restriction of ºi to
∏
j∈N H
k
j , the
set Hki = {(z′, z′′) ∈
∏
j∈N H
k
j ×
∏
j∈N H
k
j | z′ ºi z′′} is a closed subset of∏
j∈N H
k
j ×
∏
j∈N H
k
j ; see Bridges and Mehta (1995, Proposition 1.6.2). Now
let zi ∈ Hki . For each δ ∈ D, we have
(xδi , x
δ
−i) ºi (zi, xδ−i),
that is ((xδi , x
δ
−i), (zi, x
δ
−i)) ∈ Hki . Therefore, ((x′i, x′−i), (zi, x′−i)) ∈ Hki . Con-
sequently, x′−i ∈ Hk−i and (x′i, x′−i) ºi (zi, x′−i). Since the latter holds for
arbitrary zi ∈ Hki , we obtain x′−i ∈ Hk−i and x′i ∈ Mi(x′−i|Hki ). This implies
x∗i = x
′
i ∈ Hk+1i as desired.
5.2 Closed sets under a behavior relation
Assume that each set of strategies Xi, i ∈ N , is a compact Hausdorff space.
For the sake of convenience, we shall take X as the space of beliefs of each
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player i ∈ N , so that the beliefs for player i include his own strategy. In
particular we shall denote the best response relation by Mi(x) — though
it is functionally independent of the component xi ∈ Xi. Let Φ be the
class of behavior relations: φ ∈ Φ if φ = ∏i∈N φi : X →→ X such that
M(x) ⊆ φ(x) for every x ∈ X. More precisely, for each i ∈ N , the individual
behavior relation φi : X →→ Xi maps each joint strategy x ∈ X to the
superset φi(x) of player i’s best responses Mi(x).
5 For any behavior relation
φ : X →→ X and any nonempty product set Z ⊆ X, φ(Z) denotes the union
of all images φ(z), z ∈ Z, i.e.
φ(Z) =
⋃
z∈Z
φ(z).
Given any behavior relation φ ∈ Φ, a closed set under φ is a product set
Z =
∏
i∈N Zi ⊆ X such that
(i) for each i ∈ N , Zi ⊆ Xi is a nonempty compact set of strategies;
(ii) for each i ∈ N , and each belief z ∈ Z of player i, the set Zi contains
all best responses of player i against his belief: φi(Z) ⊆ Zi.
A prep set under φ is a product set of strategies Z =
∏
i∈N Zi ⊆ X that
satisfies (i) and
(iii) for each i ∈ N , and each belief z ∈ Z of player i such that φi(z) 6= ∅,
the set Zi contains at least one best response of player i against his
belief: ∀i ∈ N , ∀z ∈ Z such that φi(z) 6= ∅, it holds that φi(z)∩Zi 6=
∅.
5In the context of Basu andWeibull (1991) and Ritzberger andWeibull (1995), behavior
relations are correspondences.
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A closed set Z ⊆ X under φ ∈ Φ is called minimal if Z does not contain a
proper subset which is closed under φ. A prep set Z ⊆ X under φ is called
minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of Z.
Remark 1 (i) Basu and Weibull (1991) call a compact product set Z ⊆ X
closed under rational behavior (curb) if Z is closed under the combined best-
response relation M ∈ Φ. The concept of a minimal curb set generalizes the
notion of strict Nash equilibrium. Indeed, consider any x ∈ X. The singleton
set {x} is a strict Nash equilibrium if and only if it is closed under M , i.e. if
M({x}) = {x}.
(ii) A product set is a prep set in the sense of Voorneveld (2004, 2005) if
it contains at least one best response (but not necessarily all best responses)
to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior
of his opponents. The concept of a minimal prep set under M generalizes
the notion of Nash equilibrium. Indeed, consider any x ∈ X. The singleton
set {x} is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a prep set under M . While
the minimal prep sets and the minimal curb sets of a game can differ, they
coincide in generic finite games.
(iii) Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) call a compact product set Z ⊆ X
closed under better responses (cubr) if Z is closed under the combined better-
response relation B ∈ Φ. Because of the finiteness of X, the compactness
requirement on Z is not restrictive.
Theorem 5 Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) be an ordinal game. Suppose
that for each i ∈ N , the set of strategies Xi is equipped with a compact
Hausdorff topology. Then:
(i) for every φ ∈ Φ, there exists a minimal closed set;
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(ii) for every φ ∈ Φ, minimal closed sets are pairwise disjoint;
(iii) if Z ⊆ X is a minimal closed set under φ ∈ Φ and φ(Z) is a compact
and nonempty subset of X, then φ(Z) = Z.
(iv) for every φ ∈ Φ with closed-valued components φi, i ∈ N , there
exists a minimal prep set.
proof. Part (i). Let φ ∈ Φ and let Qφ be the collection of all sets which are
closed under φ in G. Obviously, X ∈ Qφ. Hence Qφ is nonempty. Consider
the partially ordered set (Qφ,⊆). By Hausdorff’s maximum principle, Qφ
contains a maximal totally ordered subset, say (Q∗φ,⊆). Set
Z˜ =
⋂
Z∈Q∗φ
Z and Z˜i =
⋂
Z∈Q∗φ
Zi
for i ∈ N . Observe that each Z ∈ Q∗φ is a closed subset of the compact Haus-
dorff space X. By construction, the collection of closed sets Q∗φ is totally
ordered by the relation ⊆. Therefore, every nonempty finite subcollection of
Q∗φ has a nonempty intersection. Since X is compact, the finite intersection
property holds and thus Z˜ is nonempty. As the intersection of closed sets,
Z˜ is closed. As a closed subset of the compact set X, Z˜ is compact. More-
over, it is a product set, Z˜ =
∏
i∈N Z˜i. By definition, φ(Z˜) ⊆ φ(Z) ⊆ Z for
each Z ∈ Q∗φ and, consequently, φ(Z˜) ⊆ Z˜. This shows that Z˜ is a closed
set under φ. Z˜ is necessarily minimal. For otherwise, (Q∗φ,⊆) would not be
maximal.
Part (ii). Suppose that Z, Y ⊆ X are two arbitrary distinct minimal
closed sets under some φ ∈ Φ, but Z ∩Y 6= ∅. Let C = Z ∩Y . By definition,
φ(C) ⊆ C which contradicts that both Y and Z are minimal.
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Part (iii). φ(Z) ⊆ Z implies φ(φ(Z)) ⊆ φ(Z). Compactness and nonempti-
ness of φ(Z) then implies that φ(Z) is closed with respect to φ. Hence
φ(Z) $ Z contradicts the minimal closedness of Z with respect to φ.
Part (iv). Modify the proof of part (i) and let Qφ rather be the collection
of all prep sets under φ in G. Construct as before a nonempty and compact
product set Z˜ =
∏
i∈N Z˜i, starting from a maximal totally ordered subset
(Q∗φ,⊆) of Qφ. Pick any i ∈ N , z ∈ Z˜ such that φi(z) 6= ∅. To show:
φi(z) ∩ Z˜i 6= ∅. Note that
Z˜i ∩ φi(z) =
( ⋂
Z∈Q∗φ
Zi
)
∩ φi(z) =
⋂
Z∈Q∗φ
(
Zi ∩ φi(z)
)
.
For each Z ∈ Q∗φ, the set Zi ∩ φi(z) is nonempty since z ∈ Z˜ ⊆ Z, φi(z) 6= ∅
and Z is a prep set. Moreover, it is closed as the intersection of Zi, a closed
subset of Xi, and φi(z) a closed set by assumption. Finally, the collection of
closed sets {Zi ∩ φi(z)} is nested, since Q∗φ is totally ordered. Because Xi is
compact, the finite intersection property holds and we obtain⋂
Z∈Q∗φ
(
Zi ∩ φi(z)
)
6= ∅.
So Z˜ is a prep set under φ. It is necessarily minimal. For otherwise, (Q∗φ,⊆)
would not be maximal.
Remark 2 (i) A closed set under φ is also a prep set under φ. Hence, if
each φi is closed-valued, part (iv) of the foregoing proof can be reiterated to
show that every closed set under φ contains a minimal prep set under φ.
(ii) Notice that if the relation φ is compact-valued and upper hemicon-
tinuous, then for any compact subset Z of X, φ(Z) is compact.6 In par-
6See Hildenbrand (1974, B.III, Proposition 3). The argument holds for relations as
well.
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ticular, finiteness of N , continuity of each ºi on X plus nonemptiness and
compactness of each Xi imply that M ∈ Φ is compact-valued and upper
hemicontinuous.
(iii) Also notice that in the case of a compact Hausdorff space X, a
subset of X is compact if and only if it is topologically closed. Therefore,
“compact” can be replaced by “topologically closed” in the definition of a
closed set under φ and the assertions of the theorem.
(iv) Further observe that one can define closedness of a product set Z ⊆ X
under an arbitrary relation φ :X→→X. Then the analogue of Theorem 5 still
holds true.
Finally, we obtain the analogue of an observation by Basu and Weibull
(1991): The rationalizable strategies form the largest “tight” curb set. If φ
is a behavior relation and Z ⊆ X is a nonempty compact product set with
φ(Z) = Z, then Z is called a tight set closed under φ.
Corollary 2 Under the hypothesis of Theorem 4,
(i) the set of joint rationalizable strategies R ⊆ X is a tight set closed
under the best response correspondence M ;
(ii) if Z ⊆ X is a tight set closed under M then Z ⊆ R.
proof. (i) By construction, R is a product set. By Theorem 4, R
is nonempty and compact. By construction, R =
⋂
kM
k(X) where k =
0, 1, 2, . . . and M0(S) = S for S ⊆ X. Hence M(R) = ⋂kMk+1(X) =⋂
kM
k(X) = R, since M0(X) = X. This shows that R is a tight set closed
under M .
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(ii) Suppose Z ⊆ X is a tight set closed under M . Then Z is a compact
product set with M(Z) = Z. Therefore, Z =
⋂
kM
k(Z) ⊆ ⋂kMk(X) = R.
In general, R is not a minimal set closed under M . For instance, if the
game G has two strict ordinal Nash equilibria x and x′, then {x} and {x′}
are two disjoint minimal tight sets closed under M .
6 Public Project Proposal Game
In this section, we provide a formal description and elaborate analysis of the
public project proposal game highlighted in the introduction.
Consider the problem of locating a finite number p ≥ 2 of identical public
projects, say libraries, on a street represented by the unit interval [0, 1]. An
outcome of this problem is a list of p locations, y = (y1, . . . , yp) ∈ [0, 1]p.
For p = 2 and a single-peaked preference relation R on the unit interval,
Ehlers (2002, 2003) introduces the “lexicographic extension” of R, a prefer-
ence relation P on [0, 1]p. The rationale is that a library patron will visit
his second choice library if a book he wants to borrow is unavailable at the
first choice library. Therefore, the patron’s preference for locations induces a
“lexicographic” preference relation for outcomes (lists of locations). Ehlers’
“lexicographic extension” can be constructed for any p ≥ 2:
A preference relation (weak order) Ri on [0, 1] induces a “lexico-
graphic” preference relation Pi on [0, 1]
p as follows. Given two
alternatives a = (a1, . . . , ap), b = (b1, . . . , bp) ∈ [0, 1]p such that
(possibly after rearranging the order in each sequence)
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a1Ria2Ri . . . Riap and b1Rib2Ri . . . Ribp . An agent i — with pref-
erence relations Ri and Pi — prefers a to b if [i prefers a1 to b1]
OR [i is indifferent between a1 and b1 and prefers a2 to b2] OR
[i is indifferent between a1 and b1, is indifferent between a2 and
b2 and prefers a3 to b3], etc. Agent i is indifferent between a and
b if i is indifferent between a1 and b1, a2 and b2, . . . , ap and bp .
Next consider two patrons, i = 1, 2, each with a single-peaked preference
relation Ri for locations in [0, 1], with a peak at xˆi. Let Pi denote the
“lexicographic extension” of Ri. Each patron proposes an outcome xi ∈
[0, 1]p. The pair of proposals determines the outcome y = F (x1, x2) = (x1 +
x2)/2. The public project proposal game, a particular ordinal game
G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ºi)i∈N) where players’ preference relations are weak orders
without utility representations is given by:
• The player set N = {1, 2};
• strategy sets X1 = X2 = [0, 1]p;
• preference relations º1,º2 on X1 ×X2, defined by
(x1, x2) ºi (z1, z2) :⇐⇒ F (x1, x2)PiF (z1, z2)
for (x1, x2), (z1, z2) ∈ X1 ×X2.
One obtains:
Proposition 1 Suppose the players’ peaks satisfy 0 < xˆ1 < xˆ2 < 1. Then:
(I) The game G is a best-response potential game.
(II) The game G has a unique Nash equilibrium.
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(III) Each best-response compatible path of G converges to the Nash equi-
librium in finitely many steps.
Note that property (I) holds for arbitrary xˆ1 and xˆ2. Also note that in
case 0 < xˆ1 = xˆ2 < 1, there exists a continuum of Nash equilibria, all
resulting in the outcome y = xˆ1 = xˆ2. Further observe that for a finite
game G, (I) would have as immediate consequences (II’) existence of a Nash
equilibrium and (III’) convergence of any best-response compatible path to
a Nash equilibrium in finitely many steps. It follows from the proof of (III)
that a best-response compatible path reaches the Nash equilibrium in at most
6 + d1/(xˆ2 − xˆ1)e steps, where for a real number r, the symbol dre means
“the smallest integer not smaller than r”.
proof:
part i. By Theorem 1, it suffices to show that G has no best-response cycle.
Note that in this context, a patrons’s optimal proposal against his oppo-
nent’s proposal with respect toºi is quite simple. It suffices to observe that F
is symmetric and each Fl(x1, x2) only depends on the l-th element of each pro-
posal. Thus, a best response Mi(x−i) for player i ∈ N against x−i can be de-
composed into p independent best responses Mi,l(x−i,l), l ∈ A = {1, . . . , p},
as follows:
Mi,l(x−i,l) =

0 if x−i,l > 2xˆi
2xˆi − x−i,l if 2xˆi − 1 ≤ x−i,l ≤ 2xˆi
1 if x−i,l < 2xˆi − 1
(1)
For the sake of contradiction assume thatG has a best-response cycle (x1, . . . , xm).
Define the function W : X −→ Rp which assigns to each pair of proposals
(x1, x2) the vector of real numbers W (x) = (Wl(x))l∈A where for each l ∈ A,
Wl(x) = x1,l+1−x2,l. Pick any l ∈ A and k ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}. We distinguish
between different cases according to the positions of xki,l and xˆi, i ∈ N .
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(a) Suppose that xk1,l ≥ xˆ1 and xk1,l + xk2,l > 2xˆ1. By definition of a best-
response cycle, xki(k−1),l = Mi(k−1),l(x
k−1
−i(k−1),l). Observe that the deviating
player i(k−1) cannot be player 1. Because the best-response correspondence
is single-valued, it is the turn of player 1 to play his best response at step k.
Obviously, he makes a proposal such that xk+11,l < x
k
1,l in order to obtain
xˆ1 ≤
xk+11,l + x
k+1
2,l
2
<
xk1,l + x
k
2,l
2
.
It follows that Wl(x
k) > Wl(x
k+1).
(b) Suppose that xk1,l ≥ xˆ1 and xk1,l+xk2,l = 2xˆ1. Player i(k−1) cannot be
player 2: because xˆ1 < xˆ2 < 1 and x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l = 2xˆ1, player 2’s best response
is such that xk2,l = 1, which implies x
k
1,l + 1 > 2xˆ1. Consequently, it is the
turn of player 2 to play his best response at step k and he makes a proposal
such that xk+12,l > x
k
2,l in order to obtain
xk1,l + x
k
2,l
2
<
xk+11,l + x
k+1
2,l
2
≤ xˆ2.
It follows that Wl(x
k) > Wl(x
k+1).
(c) Suppose that xk1,l ≥ xˆ1 and xk1,l+ xk2,l < 2xˆ1. As in (b), player i(k− 1)
can not be player 2. Thus, player i(k − 1) is player 1 and xk1,l = 1. But
1 + xk2,l < 2xˆ1 and xˆ1 < xˆ2 imply that x
k
2,l cannot be part of player 2’s
best response whatever the choice of location by player 1. Thus, since xk be-
longs to a best-response cycle, xk cannot satisfy xk1,l ≥ xˆ1 and xk1,l+xk2,l < 2xˆ1.
(d) xk1,l < xˆ1 and x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l < 2xˆ1. This case is similar to (c). Player
i(k − 1) cannot be player 1. It follows that player i(k − 1) is player 2 and
xk2,l = 1. But x
k
1,l + 1 < 2xˆ1 implies that x
k
1,l cannot be part of player 1’s
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best response against any choice of location by player 2. Thus, since xk be-
longs to a best-response cycle, xk cannot satisfy xk1,l < xˆ1 and x
k
1,l+x
k
2,l < 2xˆ1.
(e) xk1,l < xˆ1 and x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l = 2xˆ1. Note that player i(k− 1) can be either
player 1 or player 2. We distinguish between two cases. Firstly, assume
that player i(k) is player 1. Then, he chooses xk+11,l = x
k
1,l. It follows that
Wl(x
k) = Wl(x
k+1). Secondly, assume that player i(k) is player 2. Then, he
makes a proposal such that xk+12,l ≥ xk2,l (equality appears when xk2,l = 1) in
order to obtain
xk1,l + x
k
2,l
2
≤ x
k+1
1,l + x
k+1
2,l
2
≤ xˆ2.
It follows that Wl(x
k) ≥ Wl(xk+1).
(f) xk1,l < xˆ1 and 2xˆ1 < x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l < 2xˆ2. Note that player i(k− 1) can be
either player 1 or player 2. We distinguish between these two cases. Firstly,
assume that player i(k−1) is player 1. Then, it is the turn of player 2 to play
his best response at step k and he makes a proposal such that xk+12,l ≥ xk2,l in
order to obtain
xk1,l + x
k
2,l
2
≤ x
k+1
1,l + x
k+1
2,l
2
≤ xˆ2.
It follows that Wl(x
k) ≥ Wl(xk+1). Secondly, assume that player i(k − 1) is
player 2. Then, it is the turn of player 1 to play his best response at step k
and he makes a proposal such that xk+11,l ≤ xk1,l in order to obtain
xˆ1 ≤
xk+11,l + x
k+1
2,l
2
≤ x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l
2
.
It follows that Wl(x
k) ≥ Wl(xk+1).
(g) xk1,l < xˆ1 and x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l = 2xˆ2. This case is similar to (e). Note that
player i(k − 1) can be either player 1 or player 2. We distinguish between
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two cases. Firstly, assume that player i(k) is player 2. Then, he makes a
proposal such that xk+12,l = x
k
2,l. It follows that Wl(x
k) = Wl(x
k+1). Secondly,
assume that player i(k) is player 1. Then, he makes a proposal xk+11,l ≤ xk1,l
in order to obtain
xk+11,l + x
k+1
2,l
2
≤ x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l
2
≤ xˆ2.
It follows that Wl(x
k) ≥ Wl(xk+1).
(h) xk1,l < xˆ1 and 2xˆ2 < x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l. This case is similar to (c). Player
i(k − 1) cannot be player 2. Then, player i(k − 1) is player 1 and xk1,l = 0.
But, 0+xk2,l > 2xˆ2 implies that x
k
2,l cannot be part of player 2’s best response
against any choice of location by player 1. Thus, since xk belongs to a best-
response cycle, xk cannot satisfy xk1,l < xˆ1 and x
k
1,l + x
k
2,l > 2xˆ2.
Notice that in cases (e), (f) and (g), Wl(x
k) = Wl(x
k+1) obtains only if
xk+1i(k),l = x
k
i(k),l. Moreover, by the definition of a best-response cycle, x
1 = xm,
and xk+1 = (xk+1i(k) , x
k
−i(k)) Âi(k) xk for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}. Hence for
some l ∈ A, Wl(x1) > Wl(xm) = Wl(x1), a contradiction. Hence contrary to
the above assumption, G does not have a best-response cycle.
part ii. We distinguish between three cases.
(a) The preference profile R = (R1, R2) is such that xˆ1 < xˆ2 ≤ 1/2. In
such a case, consider the strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) such that, for any
l ∈ A, x∗1,l = 0 and x∗2,l = 2xˆ2. We claim that x∗ is the only Nash equilibrium
of G.
Note that x∗2,l = 2xˆ2, l ∈ A, is the best response for player 2 against
x∗1,l = 0, l ∈ A, since x∗2,l = 2xˆ2−x∗1,l and 2xˆ2−1 ≤ x∗1,l ≤ 2xˆ2. And, x∗1,l = 0,
l ∈ A, is the best response for player 1 against x∗2,l = 2xˆ2, l ∈ A, since
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x∗2,l > 2xˆ1 — which shows that x
∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
It remains to check that x∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
We proceed by demonstrating that a strategy profile z = (z1, z2), where for
some l ∈ A, z1,l 6= 0 or z2,l 6= 2xˆ2, cannot be a Nash equilibrium of G. First
observe that if z1,l = z2,l for some l ∈ A, then z cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Because xˆ1 < xˆ2, there exists at least one player i ∈ {1, 2} such that zi,l 6= xˆi.
This means that player i does not play a best response against z−i. Secondly,
suppose that z1,l, z2,l ∈]0, 1[ and z1,l 6= z2,l for some l ∈ A. Then, there exists
at least one player i ∈ {1, 2} such that z1,l + z2,l 6= 2xˆi. If z1,l + z2,l < 2xˆi,
thenMi,l(z−i,l) > zi,l. And if z1,l+z2,l > 2xˆi, thenMi,l(z−i,l) < zi,l. Therefore,
the profile z cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Thirdly, suppose that z1,l = 1
and z2,l = 0 for some l ∈ A. It follows that z1,l + z2,l > 2xˆ1, M1,l(z2,l) < z1,l,
and so z is not a Nash equilibrium. Fourthly, suppose that z2,l = 1 and
z1,l ∈ [0, 1[ for some l ∈ A. If z1,l = 0 and xˆ2 = 1/2, then z = x∗. Otherwise,
M2,l(0) < 1 means that (z1,l, z2,l) = (0, 1) cannot be part of a Nash equilib-
rium. But if z1,l ∈]0, 1[, then player 1 does not play a best response against
the strategy played by player 2 since M1,l(1) = 0. This means that z is not
a Nash equilibrium. We conclude that x∗ is the only Nash equilibrium of G.
(b) The preference profile R = (R1, R2) is such that 1/2 ≤ xˆ1 < xˆ2. In
such a case, consider the strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) such that, for any
l ∈ A, x∗1,l = 2xˆ1−1 and x∗2,l = 1. Then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. To see
this, note that x∗1,l = 2xˆ1− 1, l ∈ A, is the best response for player 1 against
x∗2,l = 1, l ∈ A, since x∗1,l = 2xˆ1 − x∗2,l and 2xˆ1 − 1 ≤ x∗2,l ≤ 2xˆ1. And x∗2,l = 1
is the best response for player 2 against x∗1,l = 2xˆ1 − 1 since x∗1,l < 2xˆ2 − 1.
We can prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium as in (a).
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(c) The preference profile R = (R1, R2) is such that xˆ1 < 1/2 < xˆ2. In
such a case, consider the strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2) such that, for any
l ∈ A, x∗1,l = 0 and x∗2,l = 1. Then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G. To see this,
note that x∗1,l = 0, l ∈ A, is the best response for player 1 against x∗2,l = 1,
l ∈ A, since x∗2,l > 2xˆ1. And x∗2,l = 1 is the best response for player 2 against
x∗1,l = 0, l ∈ A, since x∗1,l < 2xˆ2 − 1. Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium can
be proven as in (a).
part iii. We prove that each best-response compatible path x1, x2, x3, . . .
converges in finite time to the Nash equilibrium x∗ of G. Without loss of gen-
erality, we may assume p = 1, since best responses can be determined com-
ponentwise. We provide the complete argument for the case xˆ1 < xˆ2 ≤ 1/2,
x∗ = (0, 2xˆ2). Suppose the last adjustment was made by player 2 resulting
in (xk1, x
k
2).
(A) xk2 > 2xˆ1: Then x
k+1
1 = x
k+2
1 = 0 and x
k+2 = x∗.
(B) xk2 ≤ 2xˆ1 (and 2xˆ1 − 1 < 0 < xk2): Then xk+11 = 2xˆ1 − xk2 < 2xˆ2.
(B.1) xk+11 < 2xˆ2 − 1: Then xk+22 = 1, xk+31 = 0, xk+4 = x∗.
(B.2) xk+11 ≥ 2xˆ2 − 1: Then
xk+22 = 2xˆ2 − xk+11 = 2xˆ2 − (2xˆ1 − xk2) = xk2 + 2(xˆ2 − xˆ1).
In case (B.2), we repeat the loop, starting with xk+22 instead of x
k
2. If we
end up in (A) or (B.1), x∗ is reached in at most four steps. Whenever we end
up in (B.2), xk+2`+22 = x
k+2`
2 + 2(xˆ2 − xˆ1) for ` ≥ 1 which can only happen
finitely many times.
By symmetry, a similar argument can be made in the case 1/2 ≤ xˆ1 < xˆ2.
In the case xˆ1 < 1/2 < xˆ2, a best response by player 1 is always less than
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1 and a best response by player 2 always exceeds 0. If the best-response
compatible path x1, x2, x3, . . . did not converge to x∗ in finitely many steps,
then xk1, x
k
2 ∈ (0, 1) for all k and, therefore, xk+2`+22 = xk+2`2 + 2(xˆ2 − xˆ1) and
xk+2`+21 = x
k+2`
1 − 2(xˆ2 − xˆ1) for all k ≥ 1, ` ≥ 1, a contradiction. Hence, to
the contrary, the path converges to x∗ in finitely many steps.
7 Final Remarks
The focus of this paper lies on games with players’ preferences which are
weak orders. Within this broad category of games, we analyze games with
ordinal best-response potentials and quasi-supermodular games. We further
provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty set of rational-
izable joint strategies and of a closed set under a behavior relation.
In the context of cardinal games, it is frequently assumed that the mixed
extension of a game exists, that is each cardinal utility representation can be
extended to an expected utility functional on the set of joint mixed strategies.
Consequently, the notion of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies can be
adopted. Furthermore, the definitions of rationalizable joint strategies and
of closed sets under a behavior correspondence may include best responses
against mixed strategies. There is no straightforward and commonly agreed
upon extension of ordinal preferences from pure to mixed strategies. There-
fore our analysis and definitions are confined to pure strategies. In lieu of
expected utility comparisons, Fishburn (1978) and Perea et al. (2006) apply
first-order stochastic dominance (induced by the ordinal preferences) to joint
mixed strategies. This defines a partial order on joint mixed strategies.
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As mentioned in the introduction, there exists a sizeable literature on gen-
eralized games with incomplete or intransitive preferences. Extensions of our
analysis to generalized games and/or games with incomplete or intransitive
preferences are left to future research.
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